I₄T_EX for Philosophers Example

Professor You Department of ... University of ...

 $\mathbf{1}$

According to Ramsey (1929), you are willing to accept or assert a conditional 'If p, then q' just when, if you were to add p to your store of knowledge, your posterior probability for q would be sufficiently high to warrant you to accept or assert q. But Glymour's aliens (Glymour 2007, 194) maintain that¹...

$\mathbf{2}$

Foi we a uoisf wlk goda asw qweoij sd aoij as wefoi asd as aoijgf h. Ojka sdf k alkj. Oiafg welk sd woij fd voa wen iuh sdv oik a a iojdf iajsdf as s oiw awoiu a sdfoiu a,

$$f(x) = \frac{A(x+h) - A(x)}{h}.$$
 (1)

asdoiul. bhios:

Theorem 2.1 as df oiu as df: $jp [\![A]\!] \subsetneq [\![B]\!]$ rhin $A \prec B$.

Notes

¹See Numlock (1983) for a full account.

References

- Glymour, C. (2007). Bayesian ptolemaic psychology. In Harper, W. and Wheeler,G., editors, *Probability and Inference: Essays in Honor of Henry E. Kyburg, Jr.*,pages 181–200. King's College Publications.
- Ramsey, F. P. (1990 (1929)). General propositions and causality. In Mellor, D. H., editor, *Philosophical Papers*, pages 145–63. Cambridge University Press.